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Introduction, Motivation & Literature Review

In modern times, the automobile industry has become a relatively labor intensive industry as
compared to other industries such as the food processing industry or IT industry. Normally,
several people are involved in each process of an automobile production line. However, for a
food processing firm such as a bottled water firm, it only takes a few people to control the
huge machine in the factory. Under the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem’s assumption, a country
will operate an industry that is intensive in its abundant resource. That means a labor
abundant country will produce labor intensive goods and a capital abundant country will
produce capital intensive goods. Then, why is China, a labor abundant country, not producing
automobiles and exporting cars?

One explanation for this situation is that a high technology difference exists between
countries, which creates comparative advantages based on more than just factor abundance.
Even though the automobile industry is a labor intensive industry, the capital abundant
countries will still produce automobiles because they have higher technology and the U.S can
produce more with the same labor quantities. Thus, to make the world production more
efficient, China will have incentive to promote its own technology level and increase the
production in the labor intensive industry’s production back to itself. Given this incentive of
technology adoption, what is the tradeoff tha China faces for the technology adoption? Also,
what are the industrial policies that China can pursue to promote its technology level?

Industrial policy is an official strategic effort to encourage the development of the
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manufacturing industry. In the Report on subject of Manufactures by Alexander Hamilton
(1791), the idea of the industrial policy was first introduced. Hamilton mainly discussed that
to promote early American industry, the U.S. needed to protect the infant manufacturing
industry and encourage the development of the industry by promoting its technology level.
He specifically discussed that using the tariff revenue to support local firm’s innovations and
technology development. His idea was expanded by Tilman Altenburg (2011) in Industrial
policy in Developing Country: Overview and Lessons from Seven Country Cases. Altenburg
divided industrial policy into two main categories including functional policies and selective
policies. Functional policies encourage support on industry’s framework such as power
supply and infrastructure construction. Selective policy is direct subsidy from the government
to target area such as technology development. In this paper, we will mainly focus on
selective policy and industry outcomes if the government supports the technology
development. Also, in The 8th order of National Development and Reform Commission of
The People’s Republic of China, we can find direct support evidence that China is using
industrial policies to develop its technology level.

In this paper, we are mainly interested in the role of how technology differences matters in a
Heckscher- Ohlin model framework and what are the industrial policies’ effect on the
technology differences. We construct a model which allows us to study this technology
adoption problem. This model is a combination trade model of the Heckscher- Ohin model
and Ricardo’s idea of technology differences. In this model, there are two countries (U.S. and
China), two factors (labor and capital) and two industries (a capital intensive industry and a
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labor intensive industry.) We will study the technology adoption problem by putting different
technology levels in the industries from the two countries in this model and examine how
technology level changes in China affect the two Countries’ utility and production. For
simplicity reasons, we will use a simple Cobb- Douglas function for production and utility in
this model.

There are three major results in this paper. The first one is that when China increases its
technology level, the U.S. welfare may decreases. This result comes because of clearing
terms of trade at the beginning stage of adoption technology and the effect this has on the
trade direction. The second result incorporates a cost for technology adoption. We study the
optimal technology level given the cost function and two different payment methods. Also,
we generate the results for interesting when the original technology level in China is not zero.
The last result will give us policy outcome. I will show that under some condition, U.S. will
pay China to discourage them from adopting more technology in an attempt to prevent
welfare loss for them.

I will introduce the set up for the model and solve the model in the second section of the
paper. In the third section, I will explain the major results in the detail by using graphs and
mathematical tools. Finally, in section 3 I will conclude.

2

Model for the two countries

My model is a two country, two good and two factor model with a simple Cobb- Douglas
function. There are several assumptions for this model: First, the model has a constant return
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to scale production function. Second, the labor and capital resources in both countries are
fully hired by the two industries. Household cannot borrow across countries. And for each
goods, the sum of production quantities of both countries must equals the sum of
consumption quantities of both countries. Based on these assumptions, we have several
equations.
(1) L CH= LCHLI + LCHKI;
(2) KCH = KCHLI + KCHLI;
(3) LUS = LUSLI + LUSKI;
(4) KUS = KUSLI +KUSKI;
(5) QCHLI + QUSLI = CCHLI + CUSLI;
(6) QCHKI + QUSKI = CCHLI + CUSKI;
For simplicity, I use QCH as productions in China and QUS as productions in U.S. LCHLI is the
labor factor that is used in the labor intensive industry in China and the LUSLI is the labor used
in the labor intensive industry in U.S. Similarly, the LCHKI is the labor used in the capital
intensive industry in China and LUSKI is the labor used in the capital intensive industry in U.S.
The same holds true for capital Ks. Correspondingly, the Qs are the quantities of labor
intensive goods and capital intensive goods production for China and U.S and Cs are quantity
of labor intensive goods and capital intensive goods consumed in China and U.S.

For the labor intensive good, we have the following production functions in China and U.S.,
𝐂𝟏−𝛂
(7) QCHLI = ALI ∗ K CHα
LI 𝐋𝐋𝐈

α

𝟏−𝛂

US
𝐔𝐒
(8) QUSLI= AUS
LI ∗ K LI 𝐋 𝐋𝐈

In these functions, the QCHLI and QUSLI are the productions levels for the labor intensive
goods. For China, this industry has a technology level of ALI and for U.S., this industry has a
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technology level of AUSLI. The α is the capital share in this industry. A low αindicates a
highly labor intensive industry. An example is the automobile industry.
For the capital intensive good, we have the similar functions with different variables,
𝐂𝐇𝟏−𝛎
(9) QCHKI = AKI ∗ K CHν
KI 𝐋𝐊𝐈

ν

𝟏−𝛎

US
𝐔𝐒
(10) QUSKI= AUS
KI ∗ K KI 𝐋 𝐊𝐈

In these functions, the QCHKI and QUSKI are the production level for the capital intensive
industry. For China, this industry has a technology level of AKI and for U.S. this industry has
a technology level of AUSKI. The ν is the capital share of production in this industry.ν
should be greater than α because this is a capital intensive industry. One example of this
industry is the food processing industry because it is relatively capital intensive industry.
Solving these equations based on first order conditions will give us the nominal wage and
rental rate:
(11) w = PLI*MPLLI
(12) w = PKI*MPLKI
(13) r = PLI*MPKLI
(14) r = PKI*MPKKI
Since the two countries are under the free trade, the price for each goods is the same in both
countries. The nominal wage in both industries is the same in the equilibrium and equals to
marginal production of labor. If the wages are different, labor will shift to the higher wage
industry and then bring the wage in that industry to equilibrium again. The rental rate in both
industries is the same based on the same ideas as above and it is equal to the marginal
production of capital.
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In this model, to study the welfare of the countries, I will introduce utility functions for the
two countries:
CHτ CH1−τ
(15) UCH = CLI
CKI
s.t. PLI*QCHLI + PKI*QCHKI = PLI*CCHLI + PKI*QCHKI
τ

1−τ

(16) UUS = CUS LI CUS KI

s.t. PLI*QUSLI + PKI*QUSKI = PLI*CUSLI + PKI*QUSKI

The utility function is a function of consumptions and the maximization is subject to a
standard economy – wide one period budget constraint. U is the total utility for China and
UUS is the total utility for U.S.

Givien all these functions, we need to solve this system of equations to eliminate the
variables and express them as parameters of the model. Solving the system’s first part which
contains the production function, the optimal conditions are:
LCHLI =

BF ∗LCH −KCH
BF −BC

LCHKI = LCH −

BF −BC

BF

KCHLI = BC ∗

∗LCH −KCH
BF −BC

KCHKI = BF ∗
LUSLI =

BF ∗LCH −KCH

KCH −BC ∗LCH
BF −BC

B1F ∗LUS −KUS
B1F −B1C

LUSKI = LUS −
KUSLI = B1C ∗
KUSKI = B1F ∗

B1F ∗LUS −KUS
B1F −B1C
B1F ∗LUS −KUS
B1F −B1C
KUS −B1C ∗LUS
B1F −B1C
αα

P ∗A

1−α1−α

1

Where B =[(P LI ∗ALI ) ∗ ( νν ∗ 1−ν1−ν )]ν−α
KI

BF =
BC =

KI

B∗ν
1−ν
B∗α
1−α
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B1 is the same as B but with different technology AUSLI and AUSKI.
Solving for the system’s second part with the preference function, the optimal condition
becomes:
CKI =

(1−τ)
τ

P

∗ PLI ∗ CLI
KI

Thus, then combining it with the subjective functions, we have:
P

KI
CH
CCHLI = τ ∗ (QCH
LI + P ∗ Q KI )
LI

P

CH
CCHKI = (1 − τ) ∗ (P LI ∗ QCH
LI + Q KI )
KI

Correspondingly, we have the similar format for CUSLI and CUSKI but with different
corresponding variables for U.S.
Combining the above equations with equation (15), we can come up with an equation
between price and productions:
PLI
PKI

=P=

τ

(QCH +QUS

)

KI
∗ KI
1−τ (QCH +QUS )
LI

LI

Where we can generate Qs from the equations for Ls and Ks:
QCHKI = AKI ∗ BFν ∗ LCH
KI
α
QCHLI = ALI ∗ BLI
∗ LCH
LI

QUSKI = AUS KI ∗ B1νF ∗ LUS KI
QUSLI = AUS LI ∗ B1αLI ∗ LUS LI
Solving all these equations, we finally get an equation for the price ratio P. P equals to a
complicated expression that contains theAKI , ALI , K US KI , K US LI , ν,α,τ, LCH, LUS, KCH,
KUS.

Since we solved the equations as functions of the parameters, we can then calibrate each
8

unknown variables by plugging in numbers for them. Our aim is to study the change in the
parameter ALI the technology level in China’s labor intensive industry. We choose KCH = 1,
LCH = 4 for China because China has a low capital to labor ratio. We choose KUS = 1, LUS = 2
for U.S because U.S has a relatively high capital to labor ratio. We set αequals 0.2 because
the αis the capital share in production in the labor intensive industry. It should be low.
Based on the same idea, we set νequals 0.8 since it is the capital share in capital intensive
industry. To simplify the model, we set the preference coefficient τ equals 0.5. This means
that the preference is neutral between the two goods and the utility that you will get from
each goods is the same for the same amount of quantity. For the capital intensive industry’s
technology level in both countries, AKI and AUSKI, I set these two equals to each other and
have same value of 1 for simplicity reasons. For the value of the technology level in the labor
intensive industry in U.S., AUSLI, I set it to equals to 1. For the value of the technology level
for the labor intensive industry in China, ALI, I set a boundary from 0.25 to 1.25 to study the
change in this parameter. The numbers for these parameters is showed specifically in table 2.

3

Result and Discussion

(1) The change in variables
As ALI change, the variables in the model change. Graphs 1-4 illustrate these changes. The
P

price ratioP LI is falling as the technology level in the labor intensive industry in China
KI

increases as showed in figure 1. This change in the price ratio makes intuitive sense. When
the technology level ALI increases, the production of labor intensive goods increases
correspondingly because you can produce more goods with the same labor and capital. As the
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quantity of supply increases, the price of the labor intensive goods will goes down. Thus the
relative price ratio will goes down.

In Figure 2, there are four graphs showing the relationship between unknown variables and
ALI. The first graph is a graph that illustrates the increase in capital ratio

KCH
LI

in China when

KCH
KI

ALI increases. The growth of the capital ratio makes sense because the marginal produced of
capital increases as ALI goes up. As the marginal production of capital increases, more capital
will be employed in the labor intensive industry due to its higher efficiency. The total capital
in China is a constant in this model so when KCHLI increases, KCHKI must decreases. Thus the
capital ratio

KCH
LI
KCH
KI

increases in China. Similarly, in second graph, as ALI increases, the MPL

in the labor intensive industry increases causing labor to shift from the capital intensive
industry from the labor intensive industry in China. Thus the labor ratio

LCH
LI
LCH
KI

for China is

increasing due to the relative change between each industry’s labor forces. However, for U.S.,
the capital employment ratio

KUS LI
KUS KI

and labor force employment ratio

LUS LI
LUS KI

have the exact

opposite trend compared to China’s labor employment and capital employment ratio. This
opposite trend is based on the relative productivity’s change and the effect of the trade. In
U.S., the labor intensive industry is becoming increasingly relatively less productive. Thus,
U.S. is going to shift both labor and capital resources to the capital intensive industry from
the labor intensive industry. The capital employment ratio and labor employment ratio in both
industries are decreasing.

In figure 3, we can find out the production ratio

QCH
LI
QCH
KI

and consumption ratio

CCH
LI
CCH
KI

easily from
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the equations system. For the first graph, I find that the production ratio in China is increasing
and the production ratio in U.S. is decreasing. This result can be deducted from the change in
the capital and labor employment ratio. In China, the resources are reallocated into the labor
intensive industry so that the production in the labor intensive industry will increase whereas
the production in capital intensive industry will fall. The U.S. has exactly the opposite
situation. For consumption, we have exactly the same consumption ratio in U.S and China.
This is due to the preference function. For the preference function, we can generate a
relationship between consumption and price ratio:

CUS LI
CUS KI

=

PKI
PLI

CCH

= CLI
CH . Thus for both countries,
KI

their consumption ratio on the two goods are the same. The third and fourth graphs shows the
trade quantity’s changes in the labor intensive good and capital intensive good separately. The
trade quantity is just the difference between the quantity produced and consumed. When the
trade quantity is positive, the country is exporting, and the country is importing when the
trade quantity is negative. I find that at the beginning, U.S. is exporting the labor intensive
goods because of its comparative advantage in the labor intensive industry based on its
relatively high technology level while China is exporting capital intensive goods due to its
comparative advantage. However, as ALI goes up in China, U.S. starts losing its comparative
advantage in the labor intensive industry. Eventually trade direction changes at a certain level
of ALI.

In figure 4, we see the relationship between the real GDP and the ALI, as well as the
relationship between total utilities in the two countries and the ALI。 For the GDP curves, we
find that the real GDP in terms of labor intensive goods are increasing for both countries but
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the real GDP in terms of capital intensive goods are increasing for China and decreasing then
increasing for the U.S. We will focus more on this result later. I also find that the utility for
China is always increasing. This situation makes sense since the welfare of China as a whole
is increasing due to the increasing consumptions in both goods. Increasing consumptions are
affected by the total GDP increases. However, for U.S., the utility curve has a decreasing then
increasing shape. This is an interesting change that relate to the real GDP’s (in terms of
capital intensive goods) change. I will discuss the reason for this U –shape curve and dig
deeper into this result in the next subsection

Combining the general cases with the specific cases, we can find out that as the technology
level increases in China’s automobile’s industry, there are multiple effects. The price of
automobile is lower relative to the price of food due to the change in production. The labor
and capital resources will adjust and move into the car industry in China which will create
more of automobile and lower the production of food in China. In the U.S., the food industry
will gain more capital and labor resources and will have a higher production in this capital
intensive good while the production in the labor intensive industry will fall. The increase in
the technology level of China’s automobile industry will also change the trade direction and
generate a higher utility for China. Also, I find this interesting result that a labor abundant
country may not produce labor intensive goods, if the technology level in that country is low.

(2) Why the utility in U.S is decreasing first and then increasing?
We can explore the utility of U.S. by making a chart that contains the data at different values
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of the

ALI
AUS LI

ratio to show the effect of ALI increasing in China on the utility and consumption

of U.S. As can be seen in the data in the table 1: The Utility of U.S. is decreasing from
technology level ratio 0.25 to 0.6594 and is increasing from 0.6594 to 1.25. The utility is at
its minimum point of 0.6594. Also, we find that the decrease in utility is due to the sharp
decrease in consumption of the capital intensive good and slow increase in consumption of
the labor intensive good. The increasing of utility is determined by the sharp increase in
consumption of the labor intensive good and slow decrease in consumption of the capital
intensive good. From the previous part, we also find that the real GDP for U.S. (in terms of
the capital intensive good) is decreasing. Therefore, we can determine that when ALI
increases, the consumption of the capital intensive good is decreasing in U.S. What is going
on in this situation? The explanation is simple and depends on the direction of trade. At the
beginning, the U.S. is exporting labor intensive goods and importing capital intensive goods.
As ALI increases, China reallocates its production resources to produce more labor intensive
goods and produce less capital intensive goods. PLI falls while PKI is increasing. Thus, the
U.S. now gains less from the export and losses on the import. As a result, U.S.’s utility is
decreasing due to less welfare gained from trade. However, when ALI keeps increasing, the
trade direction will reverse and eventually the U.S. will sell capital intensive goods and gain
from the benefit of China’s cheaper labor intensive good exports. This result is showed in the
figure 5.

(3) Technology adoption depends on costs
In the previous study, we assumed the model was no cost on the promotion of the ALI in
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China. However, this situation is highly unlikely in the real world. We impose a utility cost on
increasing ALI. The equation for the utility function in China now becomes:
τ 1−τ
U = CLI
CKI − COST ∗ A2LI

This cost is a common convex cost. This cost can be interpreted in another way too. Consider
τ 1−τ
U(C) = C & C = CLI
CKI now we can think of the cost as a cost on the composite good

where the composite goods is produced using a Cobb- Douglas function.

With this new cost, we can construct a new graph for utility with the parameter as technology
on the x- axis. In figure 6, we can see that each utility curve has a different maximization
point. As a result, when costs changes, the optimal ALI, utility maximizing ALI changes for
China. Figure 7 plots out the optimal ALI for each cost value. As cost increases, the optimal
ALI falls. This makes intuitive sense because when the cost of adopting technology increases,
we will lower the quantity of technology in order to maximize the utility function which now
also depends on the COST*A2LI .

Figure 7 further plots out two curves for the optimal A LI. These two curves represent two
different methods of adopting the technology. First, the temporary method is when we invest
in technology to bring up ALI for short period (a single period). The effect of adoption here is
temporary and the economy will need to invest again in next period if it wants it to keep
technology at that new level. For an infinite period economy, the household will have the cost
every period and its utility function will be:
U=

2
CτLI C1−τ
KI −COST∗ALI

1−β
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Second, the permanent method is when the household invests in technology adoption in the
first period and then acquires the technology permanently. In this case, the utility function is
the present value of the sum of the utilities in each single period. The resulting utility
function is:
U=

1
1−β

τ 1−τ
∗ CLI
CKI − COST ∗ A2LI

As illustrated by the graph, a household is willing to pay a much higher permanent cost (vs.
temporary cost) to acquire the same level of technology. This makes perfect sense because if
you buy something permanently, you will be willing to pay more for it.

Combining the two methods together, we can plot a graph of the optimal technology level,
ALI, given combination of costs for the two methods. Figure 8 shows this result. In this figure,
0 on the z- axis implies we choose the permanent method and 1 on z- axis implies we choose
the temporary method. The graph is in a 3D space because we have two independent costs for
the two methods. For most cost combination the economy will choose the permanent method
rather than temporary method. The combination of the costs is given by points in the x-y
plane. The only situation where the temporary method will be chosen is when we either have
an extremely low cost for the temporary method or a relatively high cost on the permanent
method.

Figure 9 will expand on the idea developed in the figure 8. Instead of choices on the z-axis,
we will plot the optimal technology level ALI for a combination of the costs. Using this graph,
we can find the optimal technology level given a combination of the costs for the two
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methods. Similar to figure 8, I find out that most of the time, the permanent method will be
used but when the cost of the permanent method is very high or temporary cost is very low,
the economy will switch to the temporary method. The discontinuity in the graph illustrates
this shift.

(4) U.S. intervention in technology adoption choices in China
Combing the idea from result (2) and result (3), I study wether the drop in U.S. utility will
lead to the discouraging China from adopting new technology.

China’s gain from the adoption of the technology level equals its new utility minus its
original utility. If we assume China’s current technology level is ALI = 0.35 (for
computational ease):
GainCH = UCH (optimal ALI) - UCH (0.35)
GainUS= UUS (Optimal ALI) – UUS (0.35)
W can now plot how China’s utility changes as the permanent method cost’s change. This is
figure 10. In this graph, we see that the gains for China depend on the optimal level of ALI
which in turn depends on the cost. The curve is downward sloping because when the cost of
technology adoption is too high, China will decrease the technology level and this coupled
with higher cost will reduce their gain. Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between optimal
ALI and the cost. Notice, the difference between this curve and figure 7 is that when you get
to a certain cost level, the technology adoption is no longer optimal and the economy will
stay at the current ALI. The reason behind is that China no longer gains anything after this cost
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level as compared to staying at the current technology level ALI = 0.35.For our parameter vale
the critical cost level for this shift approximately equals to 1.5.

In the figure 12, in addition to China’s gain I also plot out the loss (negative gain) in utility
for U.S. As can be seen, as China’s labor intensive industry grows due to the high technology
adoption, the utility in U.S. is decreasing because the terms of trade in the U.S. are decreasing.
At a high enough cost level, U.S. loss is greater than China’s gain, this switching point is
given by the intersection of the two curves.

Going back to the optimal technology adoption graph (Figure 11) and adding in U.S.’s policy
action to get figure 13. In order to prevent further loss brought upon by the technology
adoption in China, the U.S. may intervene and discourage China from adopting new
technology. In general such policy of discouragement will not work, however, if gain for
China less than the loss for U.S. a beneficial trade can occur where the U.S. pays China, and
China accepts payment to stop its technology adoption policies. This is an interesting result
because it implies that it is possible that technology adoption may not be favored by the
world, even though it would lead to higher production efficiency (but not necessarily welfare
increases).
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Conclusion

In this paper, I combined Heckscher- Ohlin model with idea from a Ricardian model. The
eventual framework is a two country, two factor and two good model that allows me to study
the tradeoff of technology adoption faced by China’s government. I solved the model by
17

solving a system of equilibrium conditions generated by the first order conditions from profit
and utility maximization. The equilibrium price is a function of all the parameters. After
calibrating the model, I study the effects of changes in ALI, the technology level in the labor
intensive sector in China.

I got three interesting results from this analysis. The first one is that when A LI increases, the
U.S. can actually experience a loss in utility in some cases. After imcorporating cost into the
model, I find the second set of results which study the optimal level of technology adoption.
Finally, combining the ideas from the first and second results, I find an interesting policy
implication. I find situations where optimal policy suggests that the U.S. pay China to
discourage them from adopting new technology and China will accept such payments.
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Table 1
ALI

UUS

CUSLI

CUSKI

TradeUSLI

TradeUSKI

0.25

0.90687

0.911437

0.902559

0.495309

-0.49048

0.6594

0.857419

1.055459

0.696538

0.000

0.000

1

0.875099

1.216729

0.629392

-0.40558

0.209797

1.25

0.903073

1.351119

0.603604

-0.70693

0.315818

AUS LI

Table 2

Name

Value

Explanation

KCH

1

Total capital in China.

LCH

4

Total labor in China.

KUS

1

Total capital in U.S.

LUS

2

Total labor in U.S.

α

0.2

Capital share in production in labor intensive industry.

ν

0.8

Capital share in production in capital intensive industry.

τ

0.5

Preference factor.

β

0.5

Discount factor

AKI

1

Technology for capital intensive industry in China

ALIUS

1

Technology for labor intensive industry in U.S.

AKIUS

1

Technology for capital intensive industry in U.S.
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